A WARNING AGAINST WESTERN FRONT CAMOUFLAGE TO COVER EASTERN FRONT VICTORY

Published as a THIRD MESSAGE
To the Makers of Public Sentiment in Connecticut
By the Connecticut State Council of Defense

TO THE PERSONS RECEIVING THIS BULLETIN:

From time to time the Connecticut State Council of Defense has sent you communications in a form similar to this, on subjects which it deems to be timely and essential. At this time the Council believes it to be imperative that the democratic peoples of the world understand in advance the main conditions of the peace to be, when it shall be concluded. The Council believes it would be the supreme tragedy of history, if much that has been sublimely sacrificed for is surrendered or traded away about the council table. It is with this in view that the facts herein appearing are put before you by one whose name appears in our list of "Makers of Public Sentiment." Will you, as upon previous occasions, accept personally the responsibility of giving currency to these views, in so far as they meet with your approval?

In putting this matter before you, we wish gratefully to give acknowledgment to the *Hartford Sunday Courant* and the *New York Tribune,* for authority to reprint Mr. Simonds' article on "The Coming Peace Offensive", and to the *New York Times* for authority to reprint the editorial "No Time for Optimism", and the map entitled "The Bargain Counter."

Respectfully submitted,

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The Coming Peace Offensive.

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

Certain phrases of German Foreign Secretary Kuhlmann have been widely accepted as the first hint of a coming German peace offensive, always to be foreseen if Germany did not gain a decisive victory in the military campaign of the present year. To be sure the words of the German Minister were not themselves very explicit; they contained nothing more than the suggestion that however complete a military triumph were won by invincible German arms the war is so vast and spread over so enormous an expanse that "military alone cannot lead to victory"—there will have to be negotiation around a green table after the fighting has ended.

Thereupon there burst forth from the Junker and Pan-German elements the same clamor that followed the temporary assertion by the Reichstag last year of the Russian doctrine of "peace without indemnities and without annexations." Looking backward a year the similarity between the two incidents at the least arouses suspicion. Looking to the future, it is not difficult to see that in certain contingencies it may be valuable to Kuhlmann to be able to point to Junker rage when he seeks to impress the enemy world with his moderation—or, if he goes, the record may be useful to his successor.

In any event there are certain facts as unmistakable as anything can be. If Germany does not win the decision she seeks in the campaign of 1918 she cannot win the war and she cannot longer believe that victory is possible. The best she can hope for is to keep a part of her conquests, and she can only hope to do this if she gets peace before American troops begin their share in the campaign of 1919, when we shall have an army in France numerically as strong in first line units as the French army has ever been and stronger than the British army in France has ever been.

Germany began the present campaign not only with great advantages, but with advantages which were unsuspected by her

foes. She brought from Russia more troops than all but a few of the military men had suspected, and, in addition, she brought generals and methods which, applied to Western warfare, produced something approximating a revolution in our ideas and something uncomfortably close to a disaster of the first magnitude to her enemies' armies.

But if Germany could surprise us all by her numbers and methods in the opening of the present campaign, she could not disguise from us or from her own subjects the conditions of the last great gamble. One of her big enemies had collapsed; in place of millions of Russian troops there were in March only prospective millions and scant thousands of Americans. Germany could expect to come on to the decisive field bringing superior man and gun power, she might hope to increase the not overwhelming advantage of numbers by exploiting the advantages of position and capitalizing the mistakes of her foes and the miscalculations of her opponents. But she could not do more than this.

Such differences in mobilized resources as there were between Germany fully mobilized, with her troops drawn from Russia in line, and the armies of her Western opponents were certain to disappear once America began in earnest to send her troops over. Even before that time Britain could do much by repairing her own blunders. Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign might hope to defeat the British and Prussians before the Russians and Austrians could get armies to Western Europe, but if he failed to dispose of two enemies before two more arrived he was done. As it was, of course, the first two sufficed to dispose of him.

The Germans underestimated our ability to send men and therefore overestimated the period of time in which they would be decisively superior in numbers. This was like their mistake in the Marne campaign of 1914. They also overestimated the immediate success they could win by their first blow. What has happened in the way of sending Americans to Europe has surprised our enemy, even more than our allies, we may be sure of that. But the German saw at all times that if we meant business he would have to accomplish what he had to accomplish in 1918 on the battlefield, or thereafter, and in a smaller measure, around the green table.

His military leaders declared that they could take Paris and crush the British army in the campaigning season of 1918. They also told him that even if they were unable to do either of these

things they could win sufficient successes to enable German diplomats in the peace negotiations which would come at the end of the fighting season to save for the Kaiser a substantial part of his conquests. Now, the first part of the contract is obviously getting beyond German resources to perform. The chances of a decisive victory in the field are daily lessening; the next smash must bring victory, or at least open the road to it, or the game is up, so far as Paris or the Channel is concerned.

On the other hand, the next time the German attacks he will probably make considerable gains, he may win impressive local successes. He may even gain ground in two or three attacks, always recognizing that it is utterly improbable that the ground won will get him to Calais or to Paris. But, if the campaign ends without an Allied counter offensive, which is likely, and with the German army still patiently holding considerable areas of France won in the fifth campaign of the war, then the army can rest in its trenches for the winter season and let German diplomacy have its chance.

Past experience indicates pretty clearly the direction which German diplomacy will take. Its double purpose will be able to divide the Allies, by offering one of the nations united with us against the Hun substantial profits, say Alsace-Lorraine in France, and at the same time seeking to capitalize the war weariness of the French people, the agony due to the new wounds and the new devastation. Austria may again be deputized to carry the message.

Or there may be a convenient fight between the "Moderates" of Germany, like that of last summer, which served to distract and disrupt Allied preparations and Allied opinion, while German agents were at work in Russia preparing the way for the great collapse which had its fruition at Brest-Litovsk. We shall certainly have an irresistible push of "Liberalism" in Germany just as soon as the ruling elements decide to let it loose again.

In the last analysis, however, German diplomacy is bound to seek to achieve a German peace by transforming any negotiation into a bargain counter and making sacrifices, and conceivably real sacrifices, in the West to insure the preservation of what has been conquered in the East.

There is nothing novel about this scheme. Every one has seen from the beginning that at the precise moment when Germany saw she could not crush the Western nations she would strive to buy them off by such concessions, in the way of restoring

to them their own, as would leave her still supreme on the road from Berlin to Constantinople and beyond, and also in the disintegrating Russian Empire.

If Germany can preserve her corridor from the Baltic to the Bosphorus she may hope, ultimately, to resume the advance upon Cairo and upon India. If she can hold the Black Sea and the Transcaucasian provinces she has still another and more secure route to the Indian frontier. If she can preserve the chaos in Russia, the jumble of disorganized and disjointed states she has created from the Arctic to the Pinsk marshes, she can look forward to immediate economic supremacy in what was once the Russian Empire and an enduring insurance against a reunion of the fragments of that empire into a state which can bar her road to the Pacific.

What Germany has to fear is that her enemies will continue the war until they are victorious in the field and can, in their turn, erect, not shadow states, but real states out of the subject and suppressed nationalities along her own boundaries or within Austrian and Balkan limits. A real Poland, with 25,000,000 people, with a gateway upon the Baltic at Danzig, with German Poles united to Austrian and Russian, would close the way to Russia, would be a sentinel on Germany's eastern marches like that which Europe again and again erected in the Low Countries against France in other centuries.

A restored Poland, a unified Rumania, a Southern Slav state on the Danube, an international control of Constantinople and the Straits—these things would mean the end of all Germany's ambitions and the destruction of all her hopes. If, in addition, Austria could be resolved into its component parts, or transformed into a real federation of states based upon race, the work would be complete, but this last is perhaps beyond the power of the most victorious alliance Europe has ever seen.

What is possible is to bar the several roads of the Germans into lands inhabited by the weak and the defenceless, whether the anarchic Russians or the hapless Turks, by the creation of states which have all the necessary elements out of which to construct or reconstruct national life. And it is this order of constructive statesmanship on the part of her enemies which Germany will seek to block at all hazards. She cannot escape it if she loses the war on the battlefield, and she is determined not to make Napoleon's mistake and hold on too long. She remembers the chances he

had to save the Rhine frontier in 1814, and she will not, like Napoleon, rely too long on arms alone.

Yet it must be transparent to every thoughtful man that the real issues to be settled are not those issues which, because of their Western character, are most familiar to the Allied publics. Certainly Belgium must be liberated and restored, France must have Alsace-Lorraine and Italy her Irredenta, but Germany could pay all these prices out of her collected resources and still win the war. She might resign to Britain the title to all her own lost colonies, from Samoa to Togoland, and not feel the cost, if she were permitted to hold on in the Baltic provinces, in Poland, in the Ukraine, in the Crimea and in Asiatic Turkey.

The real danger to the world lies in that opportunity which Germany may win in this war to organize the millions of Slavonic and Latin peoples along her frontiers and along Austrian frontiers. The best hope of permanent defeat of German purposes to rule the world, to restore the domination of the Russian Empire, must be found in the creation along the pathways of German expansion of strong states capable of developing into still stronger states and effectively barring the road forever. Such states are Poland, Rumania and Serbia; while it is exactly as important that German rule should be abolished at Constantinople and the Osmanli Empire resolved into its natural elements.

The greatest danger for the future does not lie in the German threat to Paris or Calais; we may lose both and win the war, and it is hardly conceivable that we shall lose either. The greatest danger does not, in my judgment, lie on the military side, grave as are the dangers ahead and heavy as German military blows are bound to be between now and the fourth anniversary of the Battle of the Marne, which should see the climax of the present campaign. What we have to fear most now is that German military power without winning the war outright, will make sufficient progress on the map to persuade a war-weary world to make peace, ignorantly or because of approximate exhaustion disregarding the greatest issues for the smaller and better known issues which were in all minds at the outset of the struggle and continue to hypnotize most observers.

We shall have no permanent peace with Germany until the German army is beaten in the field. It can hardly be decisively beaten this year, and it will be the business of German diplomacy, once the campaign is over, to remove all chance of such defeat by negotiating a profitable peace, a peace which shall leave Germany the "jumping-off" places for next time. Just as the Napoleonic

"The Bargain Counter"



Courtesy "New York Times"

legend was invincible until Napoleon had fought Waterloo, so the legend of the German army's invincibility will survive anything but a defeat which cannot be explained away. And while the German army maintains its supremacy of the German Empire it will continue to plan new attacks upon the world.

The Europe which existed before August, 1914, has been swept away; Russia is in an upheavel which no man can measure, but there is a Poland to be made with almost as great ease as Italy was made in the last century. Poland is the natural Slav sentinel along the Vistula and for long centuries she maintained that role heroically and successfully. Serbia is the natural sentinel of the Balkans against invasion coming out of Europe from the north or out of Asia from the south. Rumania and Serbia together can hold the Danube barrier if only the Rumanian and Serbian races are united within their own natural and racial frontiers.

It seems to me that the great danger will come when the campaign of 1918 is over and German diplomacy undertakes to avoid the threat which our own enormous army, for it will be enormous by the campaign of 1919, will have for the German army. And Germany's diplomacy will seek to turn to account the war weariness of the whole world, it will beyond all else drive at French weariness and turn to instant account any new outburst of sentimental and purblind British pacifism. But beyond all else Germany will seek to capitalize American ignorance of what have become the real issues of the war by seeking to make concessions in questions once vital, still important, but no longer of first importance.

And I believe that it will in a considerable measure depend upon America's attitude whether the German peace offensive fails, as the defeat of the German war offensive depended in some part on the speed with which we got our new armies to France. We must expect and reckon with the war weariness of the masses of our Allies; we must be on our guard against weakness that comes from wounds suffered in brave resistance and in resistance maintained almost beyond human endurance. Our leadership, not perhaps in ideas, but certainly in spirit, may be the decisive factor in repulsing the German peace offensive and the German peace offensive must be repulsed if the war is to end in making the world safe for democracy or secure against the German thing, however one may characterize it.

If only the American public could be brought to see the questions of Poland and Serbia, of Rumania and of the Bosphorus

as clearly as they see the questions of Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine and the Italian Irredenta, the failure of the German peace offensive would be assured. If only the fact could be made clear that Germany and Austria could afford to evacuate Brussels and Trieste, Strassburg and Metz; if they could hold Belgrade and Constantinople, Warsaw and Riga; that Germany could well afford to lower her flag forever in South and Central Africa if she could hold open the roads to Asia, north and south—then the voice of American public opinion would warn diplomacy against German endeavors.

No man understands the Russian problem, and there is a manifest readiness on the part of the European nations which have suffered most by reason of Russia's desertion to abandon the Russians to a German fate with little sympathy. The temptation is natural, but the costs of such a course would be enormous. On the other hand, no man can suggest a way in which to insure Russian regeneration, no matter what help be furnished. By contrast the reconstitution of Poland is not only possible but carries with it the hope that behind the Polish barrier Russia may regain her national health without fear of German domination.

As it stands 75,000,000 Germans and 10,000,000 Magyars dominate populations of other races as numerous or even more numerous, and unless those races are now freed the slavery may be perpetual, and out of these enslaved races Germany will construct new armies and in due course of time make new attacks upon Europe. This is the story of Prussia; this is the history of the Hohenzollerns; and as long as the way is open and the human material is at hand the Germans are bound to keep on in their determination to restore the Roman world under German control.

We are winning the war on the battlefield. Despite the dangers in the immediate future, there is clear water not too far ahead, so far as the military problems are concerned. But we are just entering the danger zone, so far as the peace offensive is concerned. The German is preparing his new line of attack and his new methods of combat. We shall have every artifice in his whole stock employed for the precise purpose of blinding us to the real issues at stake and keeping open the roads to new expansions and the hopes of new conquests.

It is the duty of the United States to fight until Belgium is freed and France and Italy regain their lost and rightful citizens and frontiers. But this is not a measure of our duty. Coming latest into the war and having suffered least, it is our duty to

see most clearly and keep most constantly in mind what the larger issues are. Germany has dynamited the Russian edifice, but it would be fatal to leave her in possession of the ruins. Permanent Austro-German control in Serb lands would mean that the peace that follows this struggle would be a truce, a breathing spell only.

There has been a good deal of nonsense talked first and last about freeing enslaved peoples. They should be free; we ought to do all that we can to aid in liberating them; but we ought to recognize that in freeing them we are not engaged upon a quixotic mission, but in erecting barriers against our common enemy. For three hundred years and more the Serbs fought the Turk along the Danube and broke the weight of his thrust, and thus contributed greatly to the salvation of Europe. Poland likewise saved Europe against Turk and Teuton. Both races have a new mission in the new order that is to come, but it is essential that the American people should understand that the mission is one of vital importance to them, that it is a necessary part of the insurance we are going to take out against the repetition of the great tragedy of the World War.

We have got a new German offensive to meet and break, and it is idle to talk about peace terms and peace negotiations while the German is less than fifty miles from Paris and gathering his legions for a new thrust toward the Seine or the Channel. We are not out of the area of military dangers yet, and to discuss peace terms is to fall into a German trap, as we have fallen before. But it is getting close to the time, when the German will have to win his military decision or go back to his second line, and his second line is diplomacy. And we have got to be ready for him there, for we can lose the war there just as easily as on the battlefield, and and it will be harder to win back, once we have lost it in this fashion.

In the German mind a peace campaign is a war measure, and as his fighting chances diminish he turns more and more eagerly to the second arm. When we talk about peace, we Allies, it is with the thought of ending the conflict, but with the German it is merely the effort to use a desire for peace among his enemies as a means of winning something he has not won by the sword or perceives he cannot hold by the sword if the battle goes to its logical conclusion.

Unless all signs fail the German is getting ready for a new peace offensive. It will be the most dangerous of all, because with everything at stake he will make it so. If it fails, like his

present military offensive, then he will lose the war. If it succeeds he will win the war, even if he never gets another mile nearer to Paris and ultimately surrenders Metz and Strassburg.

No German peace proposal will be a real peace proposal, a proffer of peace on reasonable or possible terms, while the German army is unconquered, because all peace proposals will be controlled by those who control the German army. Therefore all proposals must be met as attacks by the enemy, not as anything else. The way to peace remains through military victory, and before we can hope for victory we must repulse first the German military attack, which is now going forward, and next the German peace offensive, which is preparing.

The German military offensive must be beaten in the west. Ludendorff has temporarily made "Westerners" of us all, but the peace offensive will be in the east, and when it opens there we, too, must become "Easterners," for the decision of the war will be based on permanent subjugation or complete liberation of eastern lands and races from the German yoke. Victory on the Marne, the Seine and the Somme must be turned to account on the Vistula, the Danube and at the Golden Horn. These are the issues of the war, the tests of real victory or of actual failure on our part and on the part of our Allies.

No Time for Optimism.

(*From the New York Times.*)

No sooner does General Foch begin a smashing attack in the Soissons sector and take prisoners and guns with the coöperation of hardhitting American divisions, than his movement is welcomed by our impressionable optimists as the beginning of the end for Germany. The note of elation rises to a crescendo of triumphant faith in victory. It is said that the French strategist has regained the initiative; that he will not lose it again; that Paris, Amiens, and the Channel ports are safe now; and that with a million American troops in the line the Germans will soon be driven from French territory. It is unfortunate that a gleam of success turns the heads of many of our people so, and that they see in it the growing dawn of victory and the sunburst of peace. The enemy is less imaginative; whatever his successes are, whatever advantage he obtains, he continues to plan a military triumph in the west—in the east he considers that he has won the war.

No optimism could be more foolish than the auto-intoxication of the Americans and their allies when a German thrust is parried, a "drive" checked or stopped, in Flanders, Picardy or the Champagne. There is reason for elation when General Foch turns on the foe and throws him back with heavy casualties and accumulating losses, as he has done in this, his first real offensive since he assumed command of the allied forces on the western front; nevertheless, his success should not be hailed as an assurance that the worst is over, and that henceforth the Germans will have to fight a defensive campaign that must end in defeat and disaster. The road to victory will be long and toilsome, however brilliant the strategy of General Foch, however valiantly the allied troops acquit themselves in the field. As that master of war has said, this is a struggle between peoples as well as between armies. It might be just as fatal for the people of the allied nations to be victims of over-confidence as for their armies to suffer from it. There is little danger of the latter; the allied soldiers know their foe, they do not make the mistake of underrating his genius for

war, his fighting ability. But there is a real danger that the allied peoples, and particularly the Americans, will be deceived by over-confidence to the point of relaxing their energies when the situation calls for a supreme effort, if a victory is to be won and a democratic peace secured.

In homely phrase winning a round—and that is just what General Foch has done in the Soissons sector—may be, and generally is, a very different thing from winning a fight. In this war Germany has won most of the rounds so far and shows few, if any signs of waning skill and strength in the field. It was never more true that the Allies need all the resources they can command to end the war in their favor. As many ships, as many airplanes, as much artillery and ammunition as can be constructed and manufactured, and as quickly as possible, is the urgent, the imperative need of a crisis which was never more acute. And as for troops, too many of them cannot be organized and trained, not two millions, but twice two millions or more. We are speaking of America's contribution—our allies are very near the end of their resources in man power.

It cannot be repeated too often that Germany designs to recruit a vast army in Russia, to match every American soldier with a coerced or corruptible Russian. Commissions have been offered veterans of the late Russian forces, many of whom are of German blood. Starvation will be the recruiting officer in many cases. There is no doubt that Germany can raise a large army in her new and her suzerain provinces. But it can not be done, or it should not be done, as expeditiously as America can put freemen in the field fully equipped and ardent for victory. There is indisputably a Russian menace in the German program.

This consideration alone should put Americans on their guard and give them pause when they huzza for a minor success, which may be temporary and will not lead to victory unless our people as well as our soldiers in the field, and our allies, combatants and noncombatants, dismiss insidious optimism and brace themselves for a long and desperate struggle. The war can surely be won with our enormous resources in man power and material, but not unless we prepare for the ordeal confronting us and give of our best.


THANKFULLY
SUSTAINED